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Abstract. This paper presents a new model of voter behaviour under methods of proportional
representation (PR). We abstract away from rounding, and assume that a party securing k
percent of the vote wins exactly k percent of the available seats. Under this assumption PR is
not manipulable by any voter aiming at maximisation of the number of seats in the parliament
of her most preferred party. However in this paper we assume that voters are concerned, ﬁrst
and foremost, with the distribution of power in the post-election parliament. We show that,
irrespective of which positional scoring rule is adopted, there will always exist circumstances
where a voter would have an incentive to vote insincerely. We demonstrate that a voter’s
attitude toward uncertainty can inﬂuence her incentives to make an insincere vote. Finally, we
show that the introduction of a threshold - a rule that a party must secure at least a certain
percentage of the vote in order to reach parliament - creates new opportunities for strategic
voting. We use the model to explain voter behaviour at the most recent New Zealand general
election.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates opportunities for strategic voting under proportional representation
(PR). The classical Gibbard-Sattethwaite theorem [19, 20] is not applicable in this framework
and, if we assume that a party securing k percent of the vote wins exactly k percent of the
available seats, then any voter who is concerned with maximising the number of seats in the
parliament of her favourite party, will not have any incentives to vote insincerely. In practical
implementations of PR a technique of rounding oﬀ will need to be applied whenever the number
of candidates to be elected exceeds the number of ballots cast (see e.g., [26], chapter 4). Cox
and Shugart [13] demonstrated that this need to “round oﬀ” can render PR manipulable. If a
party is in a position where receiving a few more or a few less votes will not alter the number of
seats it will take, then some of that party’s supporters may peel oﬀ, and attempt to inﬂuence
the distribution of the remaining seats. However the observed insincere behaviour of voters, in
particular at the New Zealand general election held September 17th, 2005, cannot be explained
by rounding oﬀ.
This paper presents a new model of voter behaviour under PR. The purpose of the model is
to demonstrate that under each and every method of PR there can arise circumstances where a
voter has an incentive to vote insincerely. The model revolves around the following observations.
A parliamentary election held under a method of PR will determine how parliamentary seats
are to be allocated. Once the election is over, and all the results are in, a government formation
process begins. We will model that process with a simple game, where the voting weight of each
parliamentary party is given by the number of seats it has won. The solution of the game will be
a government, a set of ministers, a set of policies to be enacted, and so on. Under PR, a small
change in the way ballots are cast will only ever result in a small change in the voting weights of
the parties in the post-election government formation game. But there do exist circumstances
where a small change in the way ballots are cast can eﬀect a signiﬁcant change in certain other
facets of the government formation game, in-particular in the voting powers of the parties and
in the set of feasible solutions. If a voter is concerned about these latter matters, and ﬁnds
themself in one of these circumstances, then we will see that they have an incentive to vote
insincerely.
Rounding is not the cause of these eﬀects. The cause is the parliamentary quota, and the
circumstance is when the total number of seats won by some subset of the parties is expected
to lie ”close” to the quota. To illustrate, suppose three parties contest an election held under a
method of PR, and let the vector x denote the resultant parliament (where the ith coordinate
gives the number of seats won by the ith party). Compare the parliaments x(1) = (49, 49, 3),
x(2) = (50, 49, 2), and x(3) = (51, 49, 1). Suppose that in the parliament a strict majority is
suﬃcient to pass any motion. We contend that there is no reason to a priori believe that either
the government-formation game or its solution would be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent were the post-
election parliament to be x(1) rather than x(2). We contend that a comparison of x(2) and x(3)
does not lead to the same conclusion: if x(2) is the election result, then any two of the three
parties could form a coalition government (as could all three); if x(3) is the election result, the
ﬁrst party would likely form a government alone.
In our model we will assume that voters are aware that a post-election government formation
game will take place, but that they cannot solve it. We will assume that voters ﬁrst and foremost
concern with the distribution of power in the post-election parliament. We abstract away from
rounding, and assume that a party securing k percent of the vote wins exactly k percent of the
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available seats. We show that, irrespective of which positional scoring rule is adopted, there
will always exist circumstances where a voter would have an incentive to vote insincerely. We
demonstrate that a voter’s attitude toward uncertainty can inﬂuence his or her incentives to
make an insincere vote. We show that the introduction of a threshold - a rule that a party
must secure at least a certain percentage of the vote in order to reach parliament - creates
new opportunities for strategic voting. We also show that in some circumstances any would-be
manipulators are in danger of undershooting and overshooting and need to carefully coordinate
their eﬀorts.
This paper was initially motivated by a desire to explain the behaviour of voters at the
New Zealand general election held September 17th, 2005. The New Zealand electoral system is
mixed member proportional (MMP), similar to the system run in Germany. Anecdotal evidence
has suggested that at the election some voters voted insincerely even though their doing so
could have cost their most-preferred-party seats. We shall show that the model presented can
account for such behaviour. We also investigate how the aforementioned incentives to manipulate
interrelate to the rounding. We show that the rounding may actually be considered as deterrent
to manipulation since it requires a greater degree of coordination from manipulators in order to
avoid under and overshooting.
To date, research on this topic has been rather sparse. Austin-Smith and Banks [6], Baron
and Diermeier [8], and De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni [14, 15, 16] have constructed multi-stage
spatial models of political systems that incorporate proportional representation. In these models
voters (i) have preferences over the set of policies that governments might pursue but (ii) do
not necessarily vote for the party to which they are ideologically closest. Voters might support
parties expousing views more extreme than their own in a bid to counteract votes from other
voters whose opinions lie on the opposite side of the policy spectrum. In all the aforementioned
papers it is assumed that, at the ballot box, voters can indicate a preference for just one party
(i.e. the positional scoring rule is plurality). Karp et al [22] modelled split voting in NZ, but,
unlike us, they assume voters use their party vote sincerely and their electorate vote strategically.
Below, Sections 2 (Parliament choosing rules), 3 (Indices of voting power), and 4 (Voters)
describe our model. Theoretical results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 uses the model
to explain voter behaviour at the most recent New Zealand general election, and Section 7
concludes.
2 Parliament Choosing Rules
We model a parliamentary election. We assume that a parliamentary body is to be elected,
that the body contains a ﬁxed number k of seats, and that m political parties are competing for
those seats. We assume n voters are eligible to vote, and all do.
Voters have preferences on the set of political parties A. We will denote the parties by
a1, . . . , am. Every voter has a favourite party, a second favourite, and so on. No voter is
indiﬀerent between any two parties. Every voter’s preferences can then be represented as a
linear order on A. Let L(A) be the set of all possible linear orders. The Cartesian product
L(A)n will then represent preferences of the whole society. Elements of this Cartesian product
are called proﬁles. The collection of all ballot papers will also be a proﬁle. At the ballot box,
voters do not necessarily rank the parties in the order of their sincere preference.
We assume each voter forms an expectation of what will transpire at the election. We follow
Cox and Shugart and assume that these expectations “are publicly generated - by, for example,
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polls and newspapers’ analysis” of the parties’ prospects - “so that diversity of opinion in the
electorate is minimised” ([13], page 303).
The result of the election will be a parliament. Any parliament can be represented by a
point in the simplex
Sm−1 =
{
(x1, . . . , xm) |
m∑
i=1
xi = 1
}
,
where xi is the fraction of the seats the ith party wins at the election. In this paper we will
ignore rounding and assume that a party can win any portion of the m seats. Rounding (or
apportionment) is an important issue, but its necessity and its consequences have been analysed
elsewhere ([13, 26]). We exclude consideration of rounding in order to focus more directly on
other causes of manipulative behaviour. We presume that every party decides on a party list
before the election, i.e. ranks its candidates in a certain order with no ties. After the fractions
of the seats each party has won is known, the composition of the parliament is decided on the
basis of those party lists. If a party is allowed to have k MPs then the ﬁrst k candidates from
the party list become MPs.
A parliament choosing rule is employed to calculate the distribution of seats in the parlia-
ment. A parliament choosing rule is a composition of a score function and a seat allocation
rule.
Given a proﬁle R = (R1, . . . , Rn) and a set of alternatives A, a score function assigns to each
ai ∈ A a real number. The greater this number, the better ai is supposed to have done. There
are a wide variety of score functions ([23] has a comprehensive list of them). In this paper we
will work with normalised positional score functions.
Let w1 ≥ w2 ≥ . . . ≥ wm = 0 be m real numbers which we shall refer to as weights, and let
w = (w1, . . . , wm). Let v = (i1, . . . , im), where ik indicates the number of voters that stated
that they rank alternative a kth best. Then, given a proﬁle R = (R1, . . . , Rn), the positional
score of alternative a is given by:
scw(a) = w · v = w1i1 + . . . + wmim.
Well known vectors of weights and their respective scores include:
• the Plurality score scp(a), where p = (1, 0, . . . , 0),
• the Borda score scb(a), where b = (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 1, 0),
• the Antiplurality score sca(a), where a = (1, . . . , 1, 0).
The vector of normalised positional scores is given by
scw =
1∑m
i=1 scw(ai)
(scw(a1), scw(a2), . . . , scw(am)) .
Clearly, scw ∈ S
m−1.
Deﬁnition 1. A normalised positional score function is a mapping
Fs : L(A)
n → Sm−1,
which assigns to every proﬁle its vector of normalised positional scores for some ﬁxed vector of
weights w.
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Given a vector of scores sc ∈ Sm−1, a seat allocation rule determines the distribution of
seats in parliament (x1, . . . , xm).
Deﬁnition 2. A seat allocation rule is any mapping
Fa : S
m−1 → Sm−1.
There are two main examples of such rules.
Example 1 (Identity seat allocating rule). Fa is the identity function, i.e., Fa(x) = x.
For the next example, we ﬁx a threshold, which is a positive real number  such that 0 <  ≤
1/m. We deﬁne a threshold function δ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] so that
δ(x) =
{
0 if x < ,
x if x ≥ .
Example 2 (Threshold seat allocating rule). Let  be a positive real number such that 0 <
 ≤ 1/m. Suppose x ∈ Sm−1. Then we deﬁne yi = δ(xi) and zi = yi/
∑m
i=1 yi. We now set
Fa(x) = z, where z = (z1, . . . , zm). The restriction  ≤ 1/m guarantees Fa is always deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 3. A parliament choosing rule is a composition F = Fa ◦Fs of a score function and
a seat allocation rule:
Fa ◦ Fs : L(A)
n → Sm−1.
If the identity seat allocating rule is employed, we shall refer to the parliament choosing rule as
pure proportional representation. If a threshold seat allocating rule is employed, we shall refer
to the parliament choosing rule as proportional representation with a threshold.
In practice only the plurality score has been used in systems of proportional representation.
Nevertheless we do not want to restrict our generality here as other scores may be considered
in the future (Brams and Potthoﬀ [12], for example, suggested combining PR and approval
voting scores). Note that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between parliament choosing rules and
choose-k rules (see [11] and the references therein). A choose-k rule picks a k-element subset of
the set of alternatives, which is clearly inappropriate in our context when the parties and not
the candidates are the alternatives. A parliament choosing rule reveals not only which parties
win parliamentary seats, but also how many seats each of them gets.
3 Indices of Voting Power
Choosing a parliament is eﬀectively a fair division problem. It might be thought desirable to
allocate each political party a quantity of seats in direct proportion to its support in society.
Suppose we do desire this, and suppose we accept that the support for a party can be measured
by the score it is assigned, by a score function, at an election: then PR is an obvious choice for
a parliament choosing rule.
But does PR provide a satisfactory solution to the fair division problem? For sure, each
party gets a (roughly) “fair” share of parliamentary representation. However, once the election
is over a government has to be formed and a coalition arrangement may need to be negotiated.
The political power of each player in the government formation game may not be proportional
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to either its score or its parliamentary representation. PR can divide seats up “fairly” but it is
unlikely to divide power up “fairly.”
We will assume that the distribution of power in a parliament can be computed by a (nor-
malised) voting power index. Given a parliament (x1, . . . , xm), a voting power index P computes
a vector of voting powers p = (p1, . . . , pm), where pi denotes the proportion of power held by
party ai.
Before formally deﬁning a power index we need the following, standard, deﬁnitions. A
weighted voting game is a simple m-person game characterised by a non-negative real vector
(w1, . . . , wm), where wi represents the ith player’s voting weight, and a quota q. The quota
gives the minimum number of votes necessary to establish a winning coalition. A coalition C
is winning if
∑
i∈C wi > q. Given a parliament, the formation of the government is a weighted
voting game with weights x1, . . . , xm and quota
1
2 (we will assume throughout that any strict
majority of votes is suﬃcient to pass any motion in parliament), i.e. the players are the parties
and their weights are the proportion of parliamentary seats that they hold.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and let v = (N,W ) be a simple n-person game with W ⊆ 2N being
the set of all winning coalitions. A coalition C is called a minimal winning coalition if C ∈ W
and C \ {i} /∈ W for all i ∈ C. A party is called a dummy if it does not belong to any minimal
winning coalition.
Deﬁnition 4. Any mapping P : Sm−1 → Sm−1 is called a voting power index if the following
conditions hold. Suppose p = P (x), then
PI1. If the ith party is a dummy, then pi = 0,
PI2. If the set of minimal winning coalitions of parliament x is the same as the set of minimal
winning coalitions of the parliament y, then P (x) = P (y).
This deﬁnition follows Holler and Packel’s deﬁnition of a power index for games [21]. Allingham
[5] requires also a monotonicity condition. However the Deegan-Packel index [17] and the Public
Good Index [21] do not satisfy the monotonicity requirement and we do not include it. Non-
monotonic indices have their justiﬁcation in Riker’s “size principle” [24], which says that “...
participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure winning and no larger” (p.
47).
Perhaps the best known voting power indices are the Banzhaf (Bz) and Shapley-Shubik (S-
S) indices (see [7, 10, 27]). These indices count, in diﬀerent ways, how many times a player is
critical for some winning coalition. According to Felsenthal and Machover, these two indices
“have, by and large, been accepted as valid measures of a priori voting power. Some authors
have a preference for one or another of these two indices; many regard them as equally valid.
Although other indices have been proposed — ... — none has achieved anything like general
recognition as a valid index.” [18], page 9.
It is worth pointing out that more seats do not necessarily translate into more power.
For instance, compare the parliaments (x1, x2, x3) = (98/100, 1/100, 1/100) and (x1, x2, x3) =
(51/100, 48/100, 1/100); party a2 has no more power in the second than in the ﬁrst.
4 Voters
We do not assume that the n voters participating in the parliamentary election are (directly)
“policy-motivated”, nor that they are (directly) concerned with the distribution of seats in
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the post-election parliament. Instead, we assume that voters are primarily concerned with the
amount of power each of the diﬀerent parties gain.
We assume that each voter has in mind one particular power index (let us say the ith voter
has in mind Pi). We assume that each voter is able to rank all possible vectors of power that the
index they have in mind could produce, and that this ranking is consistent with their preferences
over the set of political parties. In short, the ith voter has an order 	i on S
m−1 consistent with
his or her preference order on A. The two preference orders (on A and on Sm−1) belonging to
the ith voter are encapsulated in her utility vector ui. More precisely, we assume that the ith
voter has a vector of utilities ui = (u
(i)
1 , . . . , u
(i)
m ), normalised so that minj u
(i)
j = 0, such that:
• the ith voter prefers party aj to party ak iﬀ u
(i)
j > u
(i)
k ;
• given any two vectors of power indices p = (p1, . . . , pn) and q = (q1, . . . , qm) we have
p 	i q iﬀ p · ui ≥ q · ui, where · is the dot product in R
m.
Two voters i and j will be said to be of the same type iﬀ their power indices Pi and Pj are
the same and 	i=	j on the range of Pi = Pj . Thus a voter’s type can be viewed as a pair
(P,
), where P is a power index and 
 is an order on the range of P .
Example 3. If we denote the strict preference component of 	i as 
i, and the ith voter prefers
a1 to a2 to a3, etc., then we must have
e1 
i e2 
i . . . 
i em, (1)
where ej = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) is the vector whose only nonzero coordinate is 1 in the jth place.
Deﬁnition 5. Let L be a linear order on the set A of political parties:
ai1 > ai2 > . . . > aim.
We say that the voter’s type (P,
) is consistent with L if
ei1 
 ei2 
 . . . 
 eim,
which means that this voter prefers the parliament where all the power belongs to ai1 to the
parliament where all the power belongs to ai2 , etc.
Fix a voter i. Set Ui(j) equal to this voter’s jth largest utility. We will say that the ith
voter is uncertainty averse if the function j → Ui(j) is concave down and uncertainty seeking if
the function j → Ui(j) is concave up.
In the case of m = 3 for ease of exposition we rename parties a1, a2, a3 as A, B, C,
respectively. If a voter prefers a1 to a2 to a3, we will denote this as A > B > C.
Example 4. Consider the case where m = 3 and a voter prefers A to B to C. Suppose this voter
is comparing the vectors of power p = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ) and q = (0, 1, 0). The vector p corresponds to a
post-election situation where none of the three parties has an outright majority, and a coalition
government will need to be formed. If a voter anticipates, prior to the election, that p will be
the outcome, then she may be uncertain about the composition of the next government. The
vector q corresponds to a post-election situation where party a2 has total power, and can form a
government by itself. A voter of the opinion that q will be the outcome of the election will have
no doubt as to the composition of the next government. This voter will rank p over q if she is
uncertainty seeking, or q over p if she is uncertainty averse.
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Let L be a linear order on the set of alternatives. We will now deﬁne a relation L on
parliaments associated with L. For any two parliaments x and y we write xL y if P (x) 
 P (y)
for every voter whose type (P,
) is consistent with the linear order L. This relation is not
complete.
Consider the case of m = 3. Suppose that pure PR is used. In this case the identity seat
allocation rule is used and the vector of normalised scores for the three political parties coincides
with the parliament elected. Every parliament x = (x1, x2, x3) can be then represented by a
point of the triangle S2, whose barycentric co-ordinates are x1, x2 and x3. For every voter i,
associated with every possible parliament x = (x1, x2, x3) there will be a vector of voting power
indices Pi(x) ∈ S
2. Regardless of her index Pi, whenever the parliament x falls strictly inside
one of the triangles AKM , MKL, or KLC, then Pi(x), will be (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), or (0, 0, 1),
respectively, since two parties in this parliament will be dummies (axiom PI1). Should the
parliament x fall inside the inner triangle, then all Pi(x), will equal (
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ) (axiom PI2).
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A B
C
K L
M
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
(0, 0, 1)
(1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0)
Figure 1: Pure PR. Regions where normalised scores give equal vectors of power indices.
Should the parliament fall on the perimeter of the inner triangle (excluding points M , K, and
L) the vector of power indices will depend on the index of voting power used by the voters. For
example, the vector Pi(x) of a voter who uses Pi = Bz power index will be either (
3
5 ,
1
5 ,
1
5) or
some permutation thereof, and the vector Pi(x) of a voter who uses Pi = S-S power index will
be (46 ,
1
6 ,
1
6) or, again, some permutation of. Finally, if the parliament coincides with one of the
vertices of the inner triangle M , K, and L, the vector of indices, regardless of the index, will be
(12 ,
1
2 , 0) or a permutation thereof.
Example 5. Consider again the case where m = 3 and a voter prefers A to B to C (denote
this linear order by L). Then for the four parliaments x, y, z, m, located inside the triangles
AKM , MKL, KLC, KLM , respectively, we will have
xL y L z, xL mL z.
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This is because, for every voter whose type (P,
) is compatible with L
(1, 0, 0) 
 (0, 1, 0) 
 (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0) 
 (
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
) 
 (0, 0, 1).
5 The manipulability of proportional representation
In this section we will show that under any type of proportional representation there will exist
circumstances where a voter has an incentive to vote insincerely. For the pure PR these incentives
depend on the attitude of a particular voter to uncertainty, in which case we say that the rule is
weakly manipulable. We will then show that the introduction of a threshold creates additional
opportunities to vote strategically and that some incentives to vote strategically are no longer
related to attitude to uncertainty. We call the latter phenomenon strong manipulability.
Deﬁnition 6. Let R be a proﬁle such that Ri1 = . . . = Rik = L for some group of indices
I = {i1, . . . , ik} and a linear order L on A. A parliament choosing rule F is said to be:
• weakly manipulable at R if there exists a linear order L′ on A and a certain type of voters
(P,
) consistent with L such that for the proﬁle R′, which results when Ri1 , . . . , Rik in R
are replaced with L′,
P (F (R′)) 
 P (F (R));
• strongly manipulable at R if there exists a linear order L′ such that for the proﬁle R′
constructed as above
F (R′)L F (R).
Let us emphasise the diﬀerence between the two grades of manipulability. A proﬁle is weakly
manipulable if voters of just one particular type are in position to vote insincerely and get an
advantage through this misrepresentation. It may happen that some voters whose views are
represented by a linear order L are able to get an advantage and some are not. For example,
uncertainty seeking voters with views L may be better oﬀ by misrepresenting their preferences
by declaring them to be L′ and at the same time uncertainty averse voters with the same views
might be worse oﬀ as a result. A proﬁle is strongly manipulable if all voters whose type is
consistent with L will be better oﬀ.
In this paper we consider only susceptibility to micro manipulation, when a small percentage
of the voters try to coordinate their eﬀorts. This term was coined by Donald Saari and we refer
the reader to [25] for more justiﬁcation of the concept. Roughly speaking, F is micro (weakly or
strongly) manipulable if, as n → ∞, the manipulating group may consist of an arbitrary small
fraction of the society.
Our results are obtained for the case m = 3. In fact, this is the main case. It is clear that
if we are able to demonstrate manipulability of a parliament choosing rule for m = 3 parties, it
will be manipulable for any m ≥ 3. Austin-Smith and Banks [6], and Baron and Diemeier [8]
also assume m = 3.
Theorem 1. Let the parliament choosing rule be pure PR. Then the rule is always weakly
manipulable but never strongly manipulable. Moreover,
1. If w = a, i.e. for the antiplurality score, the rule is not manipulable by uncertainty averse
voters.
8
2. If w = p, i.e. for the plurality score, the rule is not manipulable by uncertainty seeking
voters.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let us consider a voter with preference A > B > C who
believes that if she votes sincerely, the outcome — in terms of scores — will correspond to the
point X shown on Figure 2. Irrespective of the positional scoring rule, by voting insincerely
she cannot improve the score of A, nor worsen the score of C. If she votes insincerely, she will
expect the vector of scores to fall in the shaded area. By insincerely reporting her preferences
to be B > A > C, she will move the vector of scores she expects horizontally east. This she can
do so long as the score function is not antiplurality. By insincerely reporting A > C > B, she
moves the vector of scores she expects north west, parallel to BC, and this misrepresentation is
possible except in the event the score function is plurality.
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Figure 2: Pure PR. Possible directions of change under a manipulation attempt
A small group of voters all of whom have preference A > B > C cannot escape from the region
inside KLC. They would not wish to escape into KLC, nor out of AKM . But if they were
uncertainty averse, they would seek, by voting strategically, to move the expected vector of
scores from inside MKL (or from on segment ML) to inside MBL. If they were uncertainty
seeking, they would be keen to move the expected vector of scores the other way. In either case,
if the vector of scores they expect to transpire if they vote sincerely is “close” enough to ML,
and if the score function permits, an incentive to manipulate exists. It is not true, however, that
all voters, whose type is consistent with A > B > C, will have an incentive to manipulate in
the same fashion, hence the manipulative opportunities are only weak. It is interesting to note
that if a group of voters with preference A > B > C expect that if they all vote sincerely the
vector of scores will lie “in the vicinity of ML.”, the uncertainty averse and uncertainty seeking
members of this group would then attempt to manipulative against each other, even though
they have identical preferences on the set of parties.
It is interesting to note that manipulation can be more diﬃcult for uncertainty seeking
voters than for uncertainty averse ones. The former might be in danger of overshooting and
need some degree of coordination. In Figure 3 we see how a micro manipulation attempt can
9
have a disastrous consequences if too many uncertainty seeking voters try to escape the region
MLB into the region KLM . They might end up in the region KLC and be much worse oﬀ
compared to the sincere voting outcome.
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Figure 3: Pure PR. Possibility of overshooting for uncertainty seeking voters
We now show that the introduction of a threshold creates opportunities for strong manipu-
lation but removes the danger of overshooting in any micro manipulation attempt.
Theorem 2. Let the parliament choosing rule be proportional representation rule with a thresh-
old. Then the rule is strongly manipulable iﬀ w = a.
Proof. Since the threshold seat allocation rule Fa is now used, normalised positional scores
and parliaments are diﬀerent and S2 represents only the vector of scores sc. The respective
parliament then will be x = Fa(sc). The partition on Figure 4 shows the power indices that
parties get for each vector of normalised scores.
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Figure 4: PR with a threshold. Possibility of strong manipulation
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The introduction of a threshold changes the shape of the regions in which the associated vector
of power indices is constant. The central region, in which Pi(x) = (
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3), becomes a hexagon.
In it the identity x = sc still holds. The three regions in which Pi(x) is respectively equal to
(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 1) are not convex anymore.
Suppose that a small group of voter with preference A > B > C believe that if they vote
sincerely the resulting normalised score will correspond to the point X. At this point, B does
not score highly enough to overcome the threshold. If at the election this group insincerely
state their preferences to be B > A > C, they may be able (so long as the score function is
not antiplurality ) to push B over the threshold, and move the expected vector of scores inside
the hexagon. When this group votes truthfully, the vector of voting power is anticipated to
be (0, 0, 1). Untruthful voting could bring about the vector of voting power (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3). This
is an unambiguously better prospect for all voters with preference A > B > C, regardless of
their power index and their vector of utilities: hence the introduction of a threshold can create
opportunities for strong manipulation.
Since the shape of the central region is now diﬀerent and all three acute corners are cut oﬀ
there is no danger of overshooting during any micro manipulation attempt. When m ≥4, both
strategic overshooting and undershooting are possible regardless of whether or not a threshold
is present. The following example illustrates that when m=4, and a threshold is in operation,
strategic overshooting is possible. That strategic voters could undershoot will be illustrated in
Section 6.
Assume now that four parties (A,B,C, and D) are contesting an election. Assume that the
scoring rule is plurality, and that the parliament-choosing rule is proportional representation with
a ﬁve percent threshold. Suppose that the ith voter has a preference order A > B > C > D,
uses the S-S power index, and has utility vector u(i) = (10, 9, 6, 0).
Suppose that in the event all voters report truthfully the outcome of the election would be:
vector of scores 6 44 5 45
parliament 6 44 5 45
S-S powers 3/12 3/12 1/12 5/12
Suppose that 1% of voters had insincerely reported their ﬁrst preference to be B rather than
A, ceteris paribus. The outcome of the election would then have been:
vector of scores 5 45 5 45
parliament 5 45 5 45
S-S powers 1/6 1/3 1/6 1/3
Suppose that 2% of voters had insincerely reported their ﬁrst preference to be B rather than
A, ceteris paribus. The outcome of the election would then have been:
vector of scores 4 46 5 45
parliament 0 47.92 5.21 46.88
S-S powers 0 1/3 1/3 1/3
(The ﬁgures for the last parliament do not sum due to rounding.)
In the ﬁrst scenario, where all voters report truthfully, we have u(i) · p = 5.25, where p is
the corresponding vector of power indices. In the second scenario, where 1% of the electorate
11
vote strategically, we have u(i) · p = 5.67 (rounded). In the third scenario, where 2% of voters
are insincere, we have u(i) · p = 5.00.
Thus the ith voter prefers the second scenario to the ﬁrst, but the ﬁrst to the third. When
considering a strategic vote, such a voter would likely be concerned about the possibility of
overshooting. Perhaps the ith voters attitude to uncertainty would inﬂuence his or her desire to
chance an untruth.
We note that this example shows that the strategic overshooting can occur during a micro
manipulation attempt as it is clear that in our example the numbers 1% and 2% can be made
arbitrary small.
6 The 2005 New Zealand General Election
The NZ electoral system is mixed member proportional, with a 5% threshold. Voters have
two votes - an electoral (district) vote, and a party vote. A ﬁrst-past-the-post election is run
in 69 electorates, with the winner of each electorate becoming an MP. Party votes are tallied
nationally. The Saint-Lague formula is then applied to the party votes to determine how many
seats in total each party is entitled to (if a party neither wins an electorate nor more than than
5% of the party vote then it is excluded from consideration). If a party has fewer electorate
wins than places in the highest 120 Saint-Lague quotients then its parliamentary representation
is topped-up accordingly from the party list.
The most recent New Zealand general election took place on September 17th 2005. At the
election 28.71% of voters gave their electorate vote and their party vote to diﬀerent parties ([1])
(down from 39.04% in 2002). Perhaps most of these voters split because their ﬁrst choice either
did not stand a candidate in the relevant electorate or because their ﬁrst choice had no hope of
winning the relevant electorate. But the 28.71% ﬁgure is high enough to suggest a reasonable
amount of insincere voting went on. In particular, anecdotal evidence (reports to the authors)
has suggested that some voters with preferences
Labour > Greens > ...
may have cast their party vote for the Greens. We use our model to suggest why.
The two opinion polls closest to the election gave the following results:
Poll Date Labour National NZ First Greens
TVNZ Colmar Brunton 15 September 38% 41% 5.5% 5.1%
Herald Digipoll 16 September 44.6% 37.4% 4.5% 4.6%
Table 1: Results of the last two opinion polls
Results of previous polls are available on [4]. The Green Party were not expected to win an
electorate seat, and NZ First were expected to win at most one. As it turned out, neither party
won an electorate seat. Table 2, below, shows the actual election result. Also shown is what
would have transpired had 0.4% of the electorate not given their party vote to the Greens and
given them Labour, ceteris paribus.
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Hypothesised Actual
Party
Labour
National
NZ First
Green Party
Maori Party
United Future
ACT
Progressive
Party Vote Seats SS
41.10 50 0.324
39.10 48 0.262
5.72 7 0.143
5.30 6 0.110
2.12 4 0.076
2.67 3 0.043
1.51 2 0.029
1.16 1 0.014
Party Vote Seats SS
41.50 54 0.414
39.10 50 0.214
5.72 7 0.214
4.90 0 0.0
2.12 4 0.081
2.67 3 0.048
1.51 2 0.014
1.16 1 0.014
Table 2: Results of the NZ 2005 general election
Election results were obtained from [1]. Alternative election scenarios can be investigated at
[2]. Voting power indices were calculated at [3].
Now suppose that a group of voters at the 2005 general election behave as do voters in our
model. Suppose that all members of this group were solely concerned with how Shapley-Shubik
power will be distributed in the post-election parliament. Suppose that all members of this
group rank the Labour party ﬁrst, the Green Party second, and attribute zero or negligibly
small utility to the powers of all the other parties contesting the election. Further suppose that
each group member believes that the election outcome laid out in the right-hand-side of Table
2 is a distinct possibility. Such a supposition is not unreasonable, given the pre-election polls.
Then members of this group may have an incentive to party vote Green. The existence and
strength of such incentives will depend on each individual voter’s utilities.
Deﬁne
αi =
ui(Greens)
ui(Labour)
to be the ratio of utilities of the Greens and Labour calculated for the ith voter. To construct
Figure 5 below we ﬁrst ﬁx the party votes obtained by all parties other than Labour and the
Greens. We then allow the Greens’ party vote to vary from 4.9% to 8.9% (and, necessarily,
Labour’s party vote to vary from 41.5% to 37.5%). For each possible Green party vote we show,
on the vertical axis, the minimum value of αi the ith voter must have in order to prefer the
outcome arising from this Green party vote to the hypothesised outcome arising when the Greens
secure 4.9%. For example, suppose the ith voter is comparing the outcome arising when the
Greens win 5.3% of the party vote to the outcome arising when the Greens win 4.9% (i.e. he or
she is comparing the parliament on the left-hand-side of Table 2 to that on the right-hand-side
of Table 2). This voter prefers the former to the latter provided his or her utilities comply with
αi > 0.826.
The shape of the graph reﬂects the working of the Saint-Lague formula. Consider the sit-
uation, for example, when the Greens have 5.3% of the party vote (the actual election result).
At this point, the 119th largest Saint-Lague quotient belongs to Labour, and the 120th largest
to National. As the Greens’ party vote increases (to the detriment of Labour’s) past 5.4%,
the Green party capture the 120th largest quotient from National. The Greens then win a
7th parliamentary seat, and National lose their 48th. As the Greens’ party vote rises further,
their 7th largest quotient eventually exceeds Labour’s 50th largest. No seat changes hands, but
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the Greens then have the 119th largest quotient, and Labour the 120th largest. As the Greens’
party vote increases past 5.7%, Labour’s party vote decreases to the point where its’ 50th largest
quotient falls below National’s 48th largest. National’s 48th seat is then restored at the expense
of Labour’s 50th. The cycle then repeats itself as the Greens’ party vote continues to increase.
The ith voter prefers a parliament with the Greens on between 6 and 11 seats, and with
National on 47, to a parliament without the Greens, and with National on 50, provided they
have αi > 0.676. This voter prefers a parliament with the Greens on between 6 and 11 seats,
and with National on 48, to a parliament without the Greens, and with National on 50, provided
that αi > 0.897.
The ith voter unreservedly prefers a parliament with a small number of Greens to a parlia-
ment without the Greens if she has αi > 0.897. Only those voters who value Green power nearly
as highly as Labour power would meet this criteria. Such a voter would have a clear incentive
to give their party vote to the Greens, despite their ﬁrst preference being for Labour. If this
voter party votes Green, she increases the likelihood that the Greens will reach parliament. If
suﬃciently many other group members feel and act the same way, then the Greens will enter
parliament.
The ith voter with 0.676 < αi < 0.897 prefers some parliaments where the Greens are
present to those where the Greens are not, but not all. Such group members would not have an
unambigious incentive to party vote Green unless they knew precisely how many other group
members were also going to use their vote strategically. By voting strategically they would be
at risk of both overshooting and undershooting.
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Figure 5 Graph of minimal utility ratio for which the manipulation is successful
We conjecture, then, that at the 2005 NZ general election certain voters with preference
Labour > Green > . . . felt they preferred the power conﬁguration of a parliament with a
small Green presence to that of a Green-less parliament, thought that polling data showed
the Greens might not cross the threshold, and so party voted Green in order to increase the
likelihood that the Greens would enter parliament. We do not suggest that these voters co-
ordinated, nor that they had knowledge of the preferences or intentions of others beyond what
was available from widely disseminated polling data. We conjecture that the Greens were polling
so close to the threshold that these voters were not overly concerned about damaging Labour’s
prospects without improving the Greens showing (strategically undershooting). We conjecture
that these voters were not worried about overshooting because they felt the proportion of the
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electorate that was (i) concerned about conﬁgurations of parliamentary power, (ii) had preference
Labour > Green > . . ., and (iii) had 0.897 < α, was relatively small (in particular, less than
4.0%).
Also, It may be the case that, in practice, there are many kinds of voters - some voters may
be concerned with the post-election distribution of voting power, others with the post-election
distribution of seats, others with the policies to be pursued by the next government, etc. It
would be quite possible, but unnecessarily complicated, to incorporate all these diﬀerent kinds
of voter in our model.
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a new model of voter behaviour under methods of proportional repre-
sentation. We showed that if voters are mindful of how voting power will be distributed in the
post-election parliament, then incentives to vote insincerely will exist under any method of PR.
We showed that attitudes to uncertainty may inﬂuence their incentives to vote insincerely. We
demonstrated that introducing a threshold could encourage greater numbers of voters to vote
strategically in the same manner. Studying an example of the most recent New Zealand general
election we observe that, with two major minor parties having approximately 5% support in the
society, the existing 5% threshold may be too high resulting in a high level of insincere voting.
We illustrate that rounding can to a certain degree deter voters from manipulation since it may
cause both undershooting and overshooting.
Questions this paper raises that future research could address include: How do incentives to
vote strategically vary with the choice of positional scoring rule? What if the scoring rule is not
positional? Finally, the undershooting/overshooting phenomenon as deterrent of manipulation
deserves a thorough investigation.
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